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In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 15-1915 
Ca r m e n  Ca r o t h e r s ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Co u n t y  o f  Co o k , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 12 C 6620 — Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Judge.
ARGUED NOVEMBER 12, 2015 — DECIDED DECEMBER 21, 2015
Before BAUER, FLAUM, and MANION, Circuit Judges.
BAUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant, Carmen Carothers 
("Carothers"), filed a second amended complaint against the 
office  of Transitional Administrator, Earl Dunlap, and the 
County of Cook (collectively, the "Defendants"). Carothers 
alleged disability discrimination in violation of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), as well 
as race discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
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§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). The district court granted the 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and Carothers 
appealed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district 
court's opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
The Office of the Transitional Administrator is a federal 
agency that oversees the operation of the Cook County 
Juvenile Detention Center (the "JDC"). Earl Dunlap is the 
Transitional Administrator in charge of transferring adminis­
tration of the JDC from the federal government to Cook 
County. Carothers, an African-American woman, was hired by 
the JDC in August 2005. Carothers served as an Administrative 
Assistant 1/Hearing Officer. The position involves compiling 
statistics, inputting data and creating reports, as well as 
serving as a hearing officer to adjudicate juvenile detainee 
grievances.
On or about June 22, 2009, Carothers was involved in a 
physical altercation with a juvenile detainee during a riot at the 
JDC, in which Carothers injured her hands and went on a leave 
of absence. While on leave, Carothers applied for worker's 
compensation and eventually entered into a settlement with 
Cook County.
On July 16, 2009, Diana Anderson ("Anderson"), the 
Director of Human Resources at the JDC, sent Carothers a 
letter acknowledging the injury to her hands and that the JDC 
was "able to make reasonable accommodations to your job 
duties that will not require the use of your injured hand." The 
letter also reminded Carothers that pursuant to the JDC's 
policy, she could not return to work until she had scheduled an
No. 15-1915 3
appointment with the Cook County Department of Resources' 
Medical Division ("Medical") and received clearance to return 
to work.
On December 2, 2009, Anderson sent Carothers a letter 
acknowledging that Medical released Carothers to return 
to work with restrictions. The letter noted that Carothers' 
doctor had restricted her from interacting with the juvenile 
detainees, which her job as an Administrative Assistant 1/ 
Hearing Officer required. The letter further suggested that 
Carothers review available positions at the JDC posted on 
www.careerbuilder.com ("CareerBuilder") and to contact 
Anderson if Carothers believed she was qualified for any 
position.
On December 10, 2009, Carothers faxed Anderson a letter 
stating that she could not find a position on CareerBuilder that 
accommodated her restriction. On January 12, 2010, Anderson 
sent Carothers a letter stating that since there were no available 
positions that accommodated Carothers' restrictions, "[the 
JDC] ask[s] that you contact the Pension Board ... to apply for 
Disability Benefits." Rather than contact the Pension Board, 
Carothers proceeded to send five letters to Anderson from 
January 22, 2010, through February 25, 2010, all of which 
inquired whether there were any open positions that accom­
modated her disability.
On March 15, 2010, William Kern ("Kern"), Deputy 
Executive Director of the JDC, received a memorandum from 
Deputy Transitional Administrator Brenda Welch informing 
him that Carothers was returning to work and that he would 
be her supervisor. On March 16, 2010, Carothers returned to
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the JDC as an Administrative Assistant 1/Hearing Officer. 
Upon her return, Carothers received a written job description 
for the Administrative Assistant 1/Hearing Officer position. 
The job description included conducting due process hearings 
for juvenile detainees, as well as handling juvenile detainee 
grievances. Carothers signed the job description, but wrote: "[I] 
was not a[] hearing officer when I [first] received [the posi­
tion]." But Carothers does not dispute that between March 
2007 and October 2007, Carothers completed over 188 disci­
plinary due process hearings for juvenile detainees.
After her return, Carothers worked primarily with data 
entry. In October 2010, Kern informed Carothers that she had 
to take Physical Restraint Techniques ("PRT") training and De­
escalation training on October 28 and 29, 2010, to assist with 
her position as a hearing officer. Later that day, Carothers 
requested both of those days off due to previously scheduled 
doctors' appointments. Kern denied this request, so Carothers 
submitted it to a different Deputy Executive Director, who 
approved. As a result, Kern informed Carothers that she had 
to take De-escalation training on December 22, 2010, and PRT 
training on December 27, 2010. Kern also directed Carothers to 
observe three hearing officers conduct hearings at the JDC by 
December 31, 2010.
On December 22, 2010, Carothers gave Kern a letter dated 
December 13, 2010, that was written by James M. Campbell, 
who disclosed that he had been counseling Carothers since 
January 2010. The letter stated: "[d]ue to a recent traumatic 
incident that resulted in a high degree of anxiety, I feel that it 
would be advisable to have [Carothers] avoid working with 
children at this time." Kern forwarded the letter to Anderson,
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who then informed Carothers that her request to avoid 
working with children was denied. Anderson directed 
Carothers to continue performing the job functions of an 
Administrative Assistant 1/Hearing Officer, which included 
adjudicating due process hearings for juvenile detainees.
Carothers completed the PRT training on December 22, 
2010. On December 29, 2010, Kern learned that Carothers had 
failed to attend the De-escalation training that occurred earlier 
that day.1 Kern confronted Carothers about this, but she 
explained that she did not attend because she did not know 
where the training was located. Kern did not believe her, since 
the De-escalation training occurred in the same room as the 
PRT training, there was only one room at the JDC where 
training was conducted, and the room was about 15 feet from 
Carothers' office. Shortly thereafter, Kern recommended to the 
Government and Labor Relations Unit that Carothers be 
disciplined.
On December 29, 2010, after Kern confronted Carothers 
about missing De-escalation training, Carothers began to 
shadow other hearing officers at the JDC in accordance with 
Kern's directive. During the shadowing, however, Carothers 
became nauseous and fainted. She was taken by ambulance to 
a hospital, but was released that same day.
On January 3, 2011, Anderson sent Carothers a letter stating 
that because she left in an ambulance she could not return to
1 The record is unclear why there is a discrepancy regarding which dates 
the PRT and De-escalation training were originally scheduled for and when 
they actually occurred.
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work until the JDC received paperwork from Carothers' doctor 
clearing her to return to work. The following day, Anderson 
sent a letter to Carothers indicating that she received the 
paperwork from Carothers' doctor, but it indicated that 
Carothers should avoid working with children. Because 
Carothers' position involved daily interaction with juvenile 
detainees, Anderson requested that Carothers undergo a "fit 
for duty" examination, and informed her that she needed to 
report to Medical in order to be released to "full duty."
On January 7, 2011, a physician at Medical evaluated 
Carothers and found that she could return to work, but 
should have "no contact with residents." On January 12, 2011, 
Anderson sent Carothers a letter stating that since one of 
the "primary responsibilities" of an Administrative Assistant 1/ 
Hearing Officer was interacting with juvenile detainees, she 
was going to refer Carothers to the Pension Board to apply for 
disability. Anderson also spoke with Carothers and informed 
her that she could not return to her original position due to her 
restriction regarding working with the juvenile detainees, and 
advised her to research and apply for another job at the JDC.
On February 8, 2011, Anderson sent Carothers a letter 
informing her that she was out on an unexcused leave and she 
had to either return to work or apply for permanent disability. 
The letter also stated that although Carothers had submitted 
her application for disability, she had not yet provided all of 
the required documentation. Anderson gave Carothers until 
February 18, 2011, to submit her completed disability paper­
work, or until February 16, 2011, to schedule an appointment 
with Medical to receive clearance to return to work.
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On February 14, 2011, Carothers sent Anderson a fax 
stating that the "disability paperwork has already been 
submitted." However, that same day the Disability Benefit 
Department sent a letter to Carothers informing her that her 
application was incomplete. The letter stated that to be eligible 
for review, Carothers had to submit an "Attending Physician 
Statement" and a "County Physician Statement -  or -  Certifica­
tion of Disability Status" by May 9, 2011. Despite this letter, as 
well as later conversations with Anderson, Carothers insisted 
that she had submitted her application and refused to submit 
the two requested documents.
On April 8, 2011, Anderson sent Carothers a letter inform­
ing her that she still had not completed her disability applica­
tion. The letter further stated that Carothers must either 
complete her paperwork for disability or return to work. 
Carothers' disability documents were due by April 15, 2011, 
but if she chose to return to work then she had to schedule 
an appointment with Medical by April 12, 2011. The letter 
concluded: "Your unresponsiveness will be viewed as job 
abandonment and will be referred for a pre-disciplinary 
meeting."
On April 18, 2011, Anderson submitted a "Disciplinary 
Recommendation" to the Government and Labor Relations 
Unit regarding Carothers. Anderson noted that Carothers 
"refuses to file for disability and cannot obtain a release to 
return to work full duty. She has failed to follow a directive." 
On May 4, 2011, a pre-disciplinary hearing was held at the 
JDC in front of a Hearing Officer from the Office of the 
Transitional Administrator. Carothers was represented by 
counsel at the hearing. On May 5, 2011, the Hearing Officer
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recommended discharging Carothers due to her accumulating 
over ten unauthorized absences, as well as her failure to follow 
Anderson's instructions from the April 8, 2011, letter. The 
JDC discharged Carothers in May 2011.
Carothers filed suit against the Defendants in August 2012, 
and filed her second amended complaint in January 2013, 
which alleged that after Carothers' June 2009 altercation with 
the juvenile detainee, she developed an anxiety disorder and 
that the JDC's discharge constituted discrimination on account 
of her disability. She further claimed that the JDC's discharge 
constituted discrimination on account of her race and sex. 
Finally, she argued that the JDC retaliated against her for filing 
a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC") in July 2009 alleging racial and gender discrimina­
tion. On March 30, 2015, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendants. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment 
de novo, and examine the entire record in the light most 
favorable to Carothers. Stern v. St. Anthony's Health Ctr., 788 
F.3d 276, 284-85 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Summary 
judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine disputes of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We address each of 
Carothers' claims separately to determine whether the district 
court correctly granted summary judgment.
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A. ADA Disability Discrimination Claim
To establish discrimination on the basis of a disability, 
Carothers must show: (1) she is "disabled" within the meaning 
of the ADA; (2) she is "qualified to perform the essential 
functions" of the position (with or without a reasonable 
accommodation); and (3) she "suffered from an adverse 
employment action because of her disability." Hoppe v. Lewis 
Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 838-39 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In 
this case, Carothers failed to establish that she is "disabled" for 
ADA purposes.
Under the ADA, the term "disability" means that an 
individual has: (1) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more "major life activities"; (2) a 
record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having 
such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Further, the ADA 
defines "major life activities" as including, but not limited to: 
"caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, 
eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, 
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, commu­
nicating, and working." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
Carothers argues that she has a mental impairment (an 
anxiety disorder that is "exacerbated by exposure to and 
interactions with teenagers"), that substantially limits her 
major life activity of working. But, if "working" is the only 
major life activity Carothers claims is impaired, then she has 
to show that her anxiety disorder "significantly restricted [her] 
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs 
in various classes as compared to the average person having 
comparable training, skills and abilities." Povey v. City of
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Jeffersonville, Ind., 697 F.3d 619, 623 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation 
omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630 Appendix. Furthermore, 
"[dem onstrating a substantial limitation in performing the 
unique aspects o f a single specific job is not sufficient to establish 
that a person is substantially limited in the major life activity 
of working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630 Appendix (emphasis added).
Here, Carothers has presented evidence that her anxiety 
disorder prevents her from interacting with juvenile detainees 
at the JDC. However, interacting with juvenile detainees is a 
unique aspect of the single specific job of working as a hearing 
officer at a juvenile correctional center. There is no evidence 
that Carothers' anxiety disorder would prevent her from 
engaging in any other line of occupation. Since the inability to 
interact with juvenile detainees does not restrict Carothers 
from performing either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs, 
she has not established that she is disabled within the meaning 
of the ADA. See Powers v. USF Holland, Inc., 667 F.3d 815, 
822-23 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that plaintiff was not impaired 
in the major life activity of working when the evidence only 
indicated that he could not work in truck driving positions 
involving substantial dock work, as opposed to all truck 
driving positions in general).
Carothers argues for the first time on appeal that her 
anxiety disorder not only prevented her from interacting with 
the juvenile detainees at the JDC, but also prevented her from 
interacting with any children. She argues that since "contact 
with children could occur with any job in which [Carothers] 
would have access to the public," her anxiety disorder does 
prevent her from performing a broad range of jobs. Her only 
support for this claim is a single line from James M. Campbell's
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letter that states, "I feel that it would be advisable to have 
[Carothers] avoid working with children at this time."
Carothers did not present this argument to the district 
court; thus it is waived. See Fleishman v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 
598, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding plaintiff could not argue his 
impairment limited his ability to "work" when he only argued 
it affected his ability to "function and live" in the district 
court). Furthermore, the record does not indicate 
that Carothers' anxiety disorder impaired her interactions 
with all children. Even by construing the medical evaluations, 
doctors' letters, and the fainting incident in the light most 
favorable to Carothers, her anxiety disorder was specifically 
limited to impairing her interactions with juvenile detainees.
In addition, Carothers' claim that she could not perform 
any job that had "access to the public" appears disingenuous 
when she admitted in her deposition that she was working 
part-time at Lady Foot Locker while she was on leave follow­
ing the June 2009 incident. Therefore, we cannot reasonably 
infer that her anxiety disorder prevented her from interacting 
with any children whatsoever. See Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), 
LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508-09 (7th Cir. 2014).
Since Carothers failed to show that she was disabled under 
the meaning of the ADA, summary judgment was 
appropriate.2
2
Carothers also brought an ADA claim for failure to accommodate. 
However, this claim fails because establishing that Carothers is "disabled" 
is also required for a failure to accommodate claim. See King v. City of 
Madison, 550 F.3d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 2008) (to withstand summary judgment
(continued...)
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B. Title VII Race Discrimination Claim
A plaintiff may establish a claim for race discrimination in 
violation of Title VII by utilizing the direct method of proof or 
the indirect method of proof. Harris v. Warrick Cnty. Sheriff's 
Dep't, 666 F.3d 444, 447 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In this 
case, Carothers proceeded under both the direct and indirect 
methods of proof. Her claim fails under either.
1. Direct Method
To proceed under the direct method of proof, Carothers 
must present either direct or circumstantial evidence that 
"creates a convincing mosaic of discrimination on the basis of 
race." Id. (citation omitted). Here, Carothers presents three 
pieces of circumstantial evidence she claims creates a convinc­
ing mosaic of discrimination. First, she states that Earl Dunlap 
told a group of employees, which included Carothers and 
other African-Americans, that he would "take them to the 
woodshed." Carothers interpreted this phrase as having racist 
undertones, since she believed it referred to how slaves were 
punished in the antebellum South. Second, she claims that Earl 
Dunlap once made a comment in 2008 within Carothers' 
presence that Malcolm X was right that "black people should 
have their own stuff." Finally, she states that she is aware that 
Brenda Welch was sued for race discrimination in her previous 
employment. 2
2 (...continued)
on failure to accommodate claim, must show: (1) plaintiff is qualified 
individual with a disability; (2) employer was aware of the disability; and 
(3) employer failed to reasonably accommodate the disability) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted).
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To defeat summary judgment under the direct evidence 
theory by relying solely upon circumstantial evidence, Caroth- 
ers must show that the evidence "points directly to a discrimi­
natory reason for the employer's action." See Good v. Univ. of 
Chi. Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations and 
quotation omitted). First, regarding the woodshed comment, 
we agree with the district court that the idiom "take someone 
to the woodshed" refers to punishing or reprimanding an 
individual, and there is no indication that the phrase has any 
racial undertones. In fact, according to the Oxford Dictionary 
of English Idioms, the etymology of the phrase does not 
involve slavery, but rather refers "to the former practice of 
taking a naughty child to a woodshed to be punished, out of 
sight of other people." From the horse's mouth: Oxford 
Dictionary of English Idioms 387 (John Ayto ed., 3rd ed. 2009). 
Second, Earl Dunlap's Malcolm X comment was made some­
time in 2008, yet the action at issue in this case is Carothers' 
discharge in May 2011. Therefore, no reasonable jury could 
find that either remark directly points to a discriminatory 
reason for Carothers' discharge.
Finally, although Carothers claims that Brenda Welch was 
previously sued for race discrimination, she offers no evidence 
that Brenda Welch had anything to do with the JDC's decision 
to terminate Carothers' employment. While Carothers argues 
that Ms. Welch had previously complained to Earl Dunlap 
about Carothers prior to her termination, she does not cite 
anything in the record to support this contention other than her 
own assertion. Nor does she indicate when this alleged 
complaint occurred, what its contents were, or how it affected 
Carothers' termination. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
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Ms. Welch had any role in determining Carothers' employment 
status at the JDC. Thus, even assuming that Ms. Welch held 
racial animus against African-Americans, Carothers cannot 
succeed under the direct method of proof without showing any 
connection between this animus and Carothers' May 2011 
discharge. See Harper v. Fulton Cnty., III., 748 F.3d 761, 766 (7th 
Cir. 2014) ("[B]igotry, per se, is not actionable. It is actionable 
only if it results in injury to a plaintiff; there must be a real link 
between the bigotry and an adverse employment action.") 
(citation and quotation omitted).
2. Indirect Method
To proceed under the indirect method of proof, Carothers 
must present evidence that: "(1) she is a member of a protected 
class, (2) her job performance was meeting her employer's 
legitimate expectations, (3) she was subject to a materially 
adverse employment action, and (4) the employer treated 
similarly situated employees outside the protected class more 
favorably." Winsley v. Cook Cnty., 563 F.3d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 
2009) (citations omitted). It is undisputed that Carothers was 
a member of a protected class and that she suffered an adverse 
employment action. However, she was not meeting legitimate 
employment expectations and there is no evidence that the 
JDC treated similarly-situated employees outside of the 
protected class more favorably.
Whether Carothers met the JDC's legitimate employment 
expectations is analyzed by examining her performance "at the 
time of the employment action." Moser v. Ind. Dep't o f Corr., 406 
F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original). While 
Carothers fails to address this issue, the Defendants argue that
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at the time of her discharge she had excessive absenteeism and 
was insubordinate. In the two months preceding her discharge, 
she refused to follow Anderson's instructions regarding 
submitting the required paperwork for her disability applica­
tion, and she did not schedule an appointment with Medical to 
return to work. In addition, although Carothers claims she did 
submit all of the required paperwork, the Pension Board stated 
that it did not have it, and Carothers ignored Anderson's 
reasonable requests to submit (or re-submit) the missing 
documentation. Further, at the time of her discharge she had 
exceeded the allowed number of unexcused absences by more 
than ten days. Thus, Carothers did not satisfy the legitimate 
expectations of her employer. See Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch. Dist. 
No. 86, 746 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding that plaintiff 
was not meeting her employer's legitimate employment 
expectations because she repeatedly violated the attendance 
guidelines).
In addition, Carothers fails to show that similarly-situated 
co-workers outside the protected class were treated more 
favorably. Under the similarly-situated analysis, this court 
examines "whether there are sufficient commonalities on the key 
variables between the plaintiff and the would-be comparator to 
allow the type of comparison that ... would allow a jury to 
reach an inference of discrimination or retaliation." South v. Ill. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 495 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 2007) (emphasis 
in original) (citation omitted). Generally this involves examin­
ing whether the two employees shared the same supervisor, 
were subject to the same standards and had engaged in similar 
conduct, without significant distinguishing factors justifying 
the differential treatment. Id. (citation omitted). However, it is
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a flexible analysis and above all, "common sense must guide 
this inquiry." Id. (citation omitted).
Carothers first argues that John Albright, a Caucasian male 
employee, was also injured in the June 2009 riot, but that the 
JDC created a position in training for him that had no access to 
the juvenile detainees and included a pay raise. However, 
the Defendants indicate that Mr. Albright was originally hired 
as a Youth Development Specialist, and in March 2011 was 
hired as a Professional Development Specialist because of his 
experience with cognitive behavior therapy. He worked in that 
position until June 2013, when he was appointed to Director of 
Quality Insurance. Importantly, Defendants assert that all three 
positions involve interacting with the JDC detainees.
Carothers admits she has no knowledge of Mr. Albright's 
job title, nor of his qualifications. Since Carothers' only 
evidence that Mr. Albright's position involves no interaction 
with juvenile detainees is her own uncorroborated statement, 
and she does not know what Mr. Albright's job title is, we 
cannot reasonably infer that the positions do not involve 
interactions with the juvenile detainees. See Cung Hnin, LLC, 
751 F.3d at 508-09. The only variable that Mr. Albright and 
Carothers share is that they both were injured in the June 2009 
riot. However, Mr. Albright is not a sufficiently similar co­
worker because he did not work in the same position as 
Carothers and had different training than her. See Diaz v. Kraft 
Foods Global, Inc, 653 F.3d 582, 590 (7th Cir. 2011).
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Carothers additionally argues that Donnie Mobile,3 a 
Caucasian male, had been terminated for "no call no show," 
but that the JDC had rehired him. The record indicates that 
Mr. Mobile was the Supervisor of Quality Assurance until he 
became ill in November 2011 and went on an approved leave 
of absence. Once his health improved in January 2012, he was 
rehired. Notably, Carothers admits that she has no knowledge 
of Mr. Mobile's health. Although both Mr. Mobile and 
Carothers took extended leaves of absence, Mr. Mobile did not 
violate the JDC's attendance policy. Carothers' more than ten 
unexcused absences at the time of her discharge is a significant 
distinguishing factor that justifies her differential treatment. 
See Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 538-39 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(finding that the plaintiff could not survive summary judgment 
when she failed to show how alleged comparators were 
similarly situated other than that they had the same job title).
Carothers also claims that in October 2009 she applied for 
the litigation analyst position, but Kern informed her she 
would not get it. Carothers states that the position instead went 
to a "Caucasian woman that Kern had worked with at the 
March of Dimes." However, Carothers provides no informa­
tion to support this other than her own statement at her 
deposition. Instead, the record contradicts her assertion 
because Kern was not her supervisor until March 2010. 
Further, the documentation from CareerBuilder indicates that 
Carothers only applied for two positions between October 2008 
and July 2011, neither of which was a litigation analyst
3 The record is unclear whether his last name is spelled "Mobile" or 
"Mobley."
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position. In fact, the CareerBuilder documents show that 
Carothers did not apply for a position in October 2009. As a 
result, Carothers' uncorroborated claim regarding the Cauca­
sian woman from the March of Dimes cannot defeat the 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Ford v. Minteq 
Shapes and Servs., Inc., 587 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2009) ("The 
record's only evidence of [defendant] paying more to white 
employees with equal responsibilities is [plaintiff's] own 
conclusory, uncorroborated testimony. This is not enough to 
survive summary judgment.").
We agree with the district court that Carothers has not 
established sufficient evidence under either the direct or 
indirect methods of proof. As a result, summary judgment on 
the Title VII race discrimination claim was appropriate.
C. Title VII Sex Discrimination Claim
Carothers argues that her discharge also constituted 
unlawful sex discrimination. She proceeds under the indirect 
method of proof, which involves the same four elements as 
stated above. See, e.g., Bass, 746 F.3d at 841 (listing the ele­
ments).
First, we have already found that Carothers was not 
meeting legitimate employment expectations at the time of her 
discharge. Second, Carothers only supports her claim by 
noting that Kenny Davis and Vester Young were both African- 
American male employees at the JDC who were injured at 
work and were assigned to positions that involved no contact 
with juvenile detainees. But, Carothers fails to address the fact 
that Mr. Davis and Mr. Young were both assigned to the 
"Support Clerk" position. Although this position does not
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involve contact with juvenile detainees, it is reserved solely for 
employees who have a substantiated claim against them for 
abusing juvenile detainees, but are ordered by a court to return 
to work. Earl Dunlap created the Support Clerk position to 
ensure that employees who have been charged with abusing 
the juvenile detainees cannot have any further contact with 
them. Mr. Davis and Mr. Young both had charges of abuse 
filed against them. Carothers did not.
Because Carothers failed to show that she was similarly- 
situated to either Mr. Davis or Mr. Young, summary judgment 
was appropriate.
D. Title VII Retaliation Claims
Retaliation claims proceed like discrimination claims under 
either the direct or indirect methods of proof4. See Johnson v. 
Gen. Bd. o f Pension & Health Benefits o f United Methodist Church, 
733 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). In this case, 
however, Carothers fails to identify whether she has a viable 
retaliation claim under either the direct or indirect methods of 
proof. Rather, she simply states that she was retaliated against 
for filing a worker's compensation claim after her June 2009 
injury, and for filing a discrimination complaint with the 
Illinois Department of Human Rights and the EEOC on
4 Recent circuit opinions have critiqued the utility of distinguishing 
between the direct and indirect methods of proof, however we have yet to 
abandon these two forms of analysis. See Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 
559, 564 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting recent decisions questioning the distinction, 
but nonetheless proceeding under the direct method of proof).
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December 28, 2010, and March 2, 2011.5 The indirect method of 
proof requires identifying similarly-situated co-workers who 
did not engage in protected activity and were treated more 
favorably; by failing to identify any, Carothers has waived this 
analysis. See Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 
1106 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 
297, 309-10 (7th Cir. 2012)). Thus, we will examine Carothers' 
claim under the direct method of proof.
Under the direct method of proof, Carothers must show: 
(1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she 
suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) the Defendants' 
desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the adverse action. 
See Sklyarsky v. Means-Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 F.3d 892, 898 
(7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted); see also Univ. o f Tex. Sw. Med. 
Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013) (holding that Title VII 
retaliation claims must be proven under "traditional principles 
of but-for causation"). In this case, Carothers' arguments fail 
because she does not establish any causal link between the 
adverse employment actions and her protected conduct.
Regarding the worker's compensation claim, Carothers 
includes a laundry list of adverse employment actions she 
claims were retaliatory. Specifically, she claims that Ander­
son's refusal to allow her to return to work after her injury, 
Carothers' lack of responsibilities assigned to her on her first
5 There is a discrepancy between Carothers' second amended complaint, 
which claims retaliation for filing a discrimination complaint on July 22, 
2009, and her argument in response to Defendants' summary judgment
motion and on appeal, which claims retaliation for filing complaints on 
December 28, 2010, and March 2, 2011.
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day back to work, the fact that items were missing from her 
desk, the reassignment to performing data entry functions, 
being precluded from participating in her department's weekly 
meetings with Earl Dunlap, and Kern's refusal to approve 
Carothers' requested time off for her doctor's appointments 
were all in retaliation for Carothers filing a worker's compen­
sation claim. But Carothers fails to present any evidence 
connecting any of these perceived slights to her worker's 
compensation claim. As a result, she has failed to satisfy the 
causation element. See Chaib v. Indiana, 744 F.3d 974, 987 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (affirming summary judgment where employee 
failed to show that any of the adverse employment actions she 
endured were caused by her complaints to her employer).
Carothers also argues that Anderson retaliated against her 
after she filed her discrimination claims with the Illinois 
Department of Human Rights and the EEOC. Specifically, she 
claims that the JDC Human Resources Department prevented 
her from taking the "IMPACT" test, which was a prerequisite 
for applying to certain jobs on CareerBuilder. Carothers fails to 
cite to anything in the record indicating that the Human 
Resources Department prevented her from taking the test, nor 
is there any evidence that Anderson had anything to do with 
such a decision. Carothers' uncorroborated speculation does 
not prevent summary judgment. See Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc., 
773 F.3d 871, 882 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding that plaintiff could not 
establish causation for retaliation claim when she "provided 
nothing beyond her own speculation that [her superintendent] 
had some 'say so' in the decision-making") (citation omitted).
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court 
is AFFIRMED.
